Chapter Twelve | Performance And Discharge

Most contractual relations will be terminated or ended according to the provisions or terms of the agreement, i.e., by performance of the parties. However, some contracts will be terminated or ended by certain acts of the parties, by operation of law, by impossibility of performance (an issue discussed previously in the chapter on consideration), mutual rescission or agreement of the parties, or through some legally recognized excuse. When payment of money is called for in a contract, the contract will be completed by the payment of money. If a check is tendered by a debtor or by a purchaser, the payment by the check is a conditional payment and the underlying obligation is not discharged until the check is actually “paid” or honored by the bank. Unless the agreement stipulates otherwise, a creditor can refuse to accept a check because technically a check is not legal tender. Rather, a check is a substitute for money. [See UCC §2 511.]  If payment is only to be accepted in cash or in some other form (for example, a barter transaction), this should be clearly stated in the contract. A tender is defined as an “unconditional offer of a debtor to pay to the creditor the exact amount due on the date due.” If a creditor refuses to accept a tender by the debtor, the debt is not discharged, but the refusal to accept the tender stops the running of any interest charges, may lift any liens filed against property held by the debtor, and may also prevent charging court costs and attorney’s fees to the debtor in the event a suit is filed.

Time For Performance

Where a time of performance is stated in the contract and the time is clear and unambiguous, performance must be made on or before that date. When no time is specified in the contract, a party has a reasonable time to perform. Where the nature of the contract is such that time is not an important factor, reasonable delay may be permitted by a court. Where a clause in a contract expressly states “time is of the essence” or the nature of the contract itself is such that time is obviously an important factor (construction contracts or contracts for purchase or sale of perishable goods), the failure to perform on time may be actionable as a breach and may under certain circumstances permit a party to rescind a contract, cancel a contract, seek a substitute performance, seek the remedy of cover or resale, or seek monetary damages.

The Doctrines Of Material Breach And Substantial Performance

When a party fails to perform a promise according to its terms, it is important to determine if the breach is material. If the breach is material, the aggrieved party may sue for “total breach” and the aggrieved party may have the power to cancel the contract. If the breach is not material, the aggrieved party may sue for “partial breach,” but may not cancel the contract. While the rules may seem clear, there is no simple test to determine whether the breach is material. Materiality is ordinarily a question of fact for a jury. Among the factors to be considered are:

  1. To what extent, if any, the contract has been performed at the time of the breach. “A breach which occurs at the very beginning [of a contract] is more likely to be deemed material even if it is relatively small.” (Note, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 358 (1921)).
  2. A willful breach is more likely to be considered as material than a breach caused by negligence or other circumstances.
  3. A quantitatively serious breach is more likely to be considered material.

It is recognized that full performance is required in most cases to discharge a contractual obligation. It is also recognized that some agreements (for example, certain construction contracts) are quite complex. In such cases, a court may apply the doctrine of substantial performance to determine if a breach has occurred. This doctrine permits recovery where there has been substantial performance, subject to an offset (deduction) for a nominal, trifling, or technical breach, or a departure from the strict letter of the contract. In order to apply the substantial performance doctrine, the part of the contract that is unperformed must not destroy the value or the purpose of the contract and the doctrine does not apply where the breach is willful or intentional. 

Performance Subject To The Standard Of Satisfaction

When one party to an agreement contracts to “personally satisfy” the promisee, courts will apply one of two tests, depending on the nature of the contract: When a contract involves personal taste, skill or fancy, the promisee has, in effect, the final word and may reject a performance, even if it is alleged that such a rejection is subjectively arbitrary or capricious. However, most courts will require at least a “good faith” standard in the rejection; that is, a court will require an “honest or good faith reason” for the rejection. The interesting case of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his rejection of an official portrait on ground that he “just didn’t like it” provides an application of this rule.  Where the subject matter of the contract concerns matters that are not purely personal in nature, the courts will apply an objective standard; that is, if a reasonable person would be satisfied with the performance, the promisor may be permitted to recover under the terms of the contract. This issue would be one for a jury to determine.

Example

A manufacturer of pre-fabricated housing offers the following statement:  “All windows, doors, and other parts of the home all made to your satisfaction.”

In this case, most courts would apply the objective or reasonable person standard to judge a rejection of the items described in the contract.Contracts may also contain a provision that completion of the contract “depends upon the satisfaction of a third party” (an architect, a building inspector, an appraiser, etc.). In such a case, the court would apply an objective test and might permit recovery of amounts due under the contract if the court determines that the certificate of approval is unnecessary, or was withheld due to “bad faith,” fraud, mistake, or gross error on the part of the third party. Read the Plante case. What standard did the court apply?  Note especially the measure of damages.  

Case Study

Plante v. Jacobs

Supreme Court Of Wisconsin, 10 WIS. 2D 567, 103 N.W. 2D 296 (1960)

Overview

The Jacobs’ entered into a written contract with the plaintiff, Plante, to furnish the materials and to construct a house on their lot, in accordance with plans and specifications, for a sum of $26,756. During the course of construction, the plaintiff was paid $20,000. Disputes arose between the parties concerning the work being done. The Jacobs refused to continue paying. The plaintiff did not complete the house. The trial court found that the contract was substantially performed. The Jacobs were told to pay $4,152.90 plus interest and court costs.

Outcome

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s judgment. Although there were some twenty items of incomplete or faulty performance by the builder, none of these was made the essence of the contract. Therefore the court held that substantial performance was evident. The court held, however, that the correct rule for determining damages due to faulty construction amounting to incomplete performance “is the difference between the value of the house as it stands with faulty and incomplete construction, and the value of the house if it had been constructed in strict accordance with the plans and specifications. This is the diminished value rule.”

What standard did the court apply in the Plante case? Note especially the measure of damages.

Discharge By Acts Of The Parties (Conditions)

The legal distinction between a covenant and a condition is very important. A covenant is a promise and determines what must be performed in order to discharge a contractual duty. Conditions determine when and if a duty must be performed at peril of breach of contract. The failure of a promisor to perform a covenant may be a breach of contract. If circumstances arise which leave a condition unsatisfied, the legal consequence is that the dependent promise does not become a matter of any contractual duty. Failure to satisfy a condition, on the other hand, is never a breach of contract.  Many contracts contain conditions, either express or implied, that control performance. A condition is traditionally defined as an act or an event, other than a lapse of time, which affects a duty to render a promised performance. These conditions are termed concurrent, precedent, or subsequent. Concurrent conditions are those conditions that require that the performance of both parties take place at the same time. Thus, neither party can demand that the other party perform first. Most bilateral contracts contain concurrent conditions (i.e., the sale of goods, which requires both payment and delivery to occur simultaneously; or a real estate transaction where the buyer tenders the money and the seller tenders the deed). A condition precedent is an act, an event, circumstance, or contingency that must occur according to the express or implied terms of the agreement or be satisfied or excused before a duty of performance is required under a contract. A non-technical formulation of a condition precedent might be: “I am not liable to perform this promise unless _______________.”  In the case of a unilateral contract, Smith’s performance is a condition precedent to Jones’ duty of payment. As an example, an insurance policy may require that an insured driver must give notice of a loss within a certain specified period after the occurrence of the loss. Failure to provide the insurance carrier with the required notice may permit the insurer to deny liability or coverage. A second example occurs in many real estate contracts: “This contract is contingent upon the buyer securing a suitable mortgage….” A condition subsequent is any fact, the existence or occurrence of which by agreement of the parties, operates to discharge or terminate an existing duty of performance. For example, a contract may provide that a party will be released from “any and all obligations” upon the happening of a certain event  (for example, “if interest rates rise to 10% or more by June 1, 2012, the borrower may withdraw from this transaction”). A simple example can be found in the following: “I am liable to perform this promise until or unless __________ [a factual circumstance will be inserted].” Parties to a contract may mutually agree to terminate or rescind an agreement and place each other in their original positions. The surrender of rights under the original agreement by each party is the consideration for the mutual agreement of rescission. It should be noted that the mutual rescission of a contract to sell or buy land would be required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds.

Other Acts Of Termination

Novation

The abandoning of a prior contract and substituting a new contract in its place is termed a novation. A novation is accomplished by an agreement to discharge a previous contractual duty or to release the party who was originally bound to a contract and substitute a new party who agrees to undertake performance and to be bound by the contract. A novation may never be presumed (even from the passage of a significant amount of time) and must always be affirmatively proven by the party who is claiming a release from a prior contract. If the original contract was required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds, so too must the novation be in writing. This is sometimes called the “equal dignity” doctrine. 

Accord And Satisfaction

An accord is an agreement to substitute performance in satisfaction of an original debt or obligation. When the agreement is executed and satisfaction has been made, it is called an accord and satisfaction (discussed earlier in the case of A. G. King Tree Surgeons v. Deeb).

Anticipatory Breach

At common law, a breach of contract could not occur until the time for performance had arrived. However, since the English case of Hochester v. DeLaTour (1853), courts have recognized that a total breach of a contract may occur if a party unequivocally repudiates the contract—even prior to the date stipulated in the contract. A repudiation is a “positive statement to the promisee or other person having a right under the contract, indicating that the promisor will not or cannot substantially perform his contractual duties.”  (Martin v. Kavanewsky, 157 Conn. 514 (1969)). The facts of Hochester v. DeLaTour (118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853)) are illuminating. In April of 1852, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract under which the plaintiff was to work for a fixed period of time commencing on June 1, 1852. On May 11, 1852, the defendant stated he would not perform. The plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract. The defendant contended that no breach could occur until the time for performance (June 1, 1852) had arrived. The court disagreed and in so doing created the doctrine of anticipatory breach. Under the common law, when an anticipatory breach occurs, the aggrieved party has the right to elect between two remedies. An aggrieved party may:

  • Wait until the time for performance and sue for the actual breach; or 
  • Treat the repudiation as an anticipatory breach and sue immediately.

The UCC incorporated the common law rule concerning anticipatory repudiation in UCC §2-610. The UCC notes that the aggrieved party may “for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the repudiating party” or “may immediately resort to any remedy for breach.”  As we will see in the discussion on sales, the Code also provides that when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise, a party may demand “adequate assurances of performance,” and in the interim, may suspend his performance until he receives such assurances. (UCC §2-609). The Code further provides that 

“After receipt of a justified demand, failure to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.”  Grounds for insecurity will be judged according to “reasonable commercial standards” of “good faith” and “honesty in fact.”

Operation Of Law

A contract may be discharged by operation of law when a statute has made the subject matter of the agreement unlawful, where the contract is judged to be in a violation of public policy, or where a statute may excuse performance. Chapter 12 discusses the area of the legality of the subject matter of a contract. For example, a discharge in bankruptcy is the result of a proceeding in which the debtor is released from an obligation to pay a debt. By law, the discharge, properly granted, terminates the obligation to pay the debt.

Impossibility

Review the materials presented earlier on the termination of offers relating to objective and subjective impossibility. Here is another “dance lesson” case. It is far less dramatic than the Vokes case!   

Case Summary

Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc.

Appellate Court Of Illinois, 2D Div., 1St Dis.

10 Ill. App. 3D 1000, 295 N.E. 2D  487 (1973)

BACKGROUND AND FACTS Plaintiff Parker, a thirty seven year old college educated bachelor who lived alone, contracted over two years for a total of 2,734 hours of dance lessons for which he had paid $24,812.80. Each contract, and each extension, contained the same boldface words, “NON CANCELABLE CONTRACT,” and some included a statement that no refunds would be made. Parker was seriously injured in an automobile accident and rendered incapable of continuing his dance lessons. Parker sued Arthur Murray to recover money paid for unused lessons. DECISION AND RATIONALE The trial court’s ruling that impossibility of performance was grounds for rescission was upheld, and despite the contract provisions Parker was allowed to recover the prepaid sums of money for unused lessons. The appellate court held that the plaintiff never contemplated waiving the right to invoke the doctrine of impossibility of performance. “Although neither party to a contract should be relieved from performance on the ground that good business judgment was lacking, a court will not place upon language a ridiculous construction. We conclude that plaintiff did not waive his right to assert the doctrine of impossibility.” The modern doctrine of impossibility can be traced to the 1863 case of Taylor v. Caldwell (122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863). In this case, the defendant had promised to allow the plaintiff to use his music hall for giving concerts. Prior to the time of performance, a fire destroyed the music hall. The English court held that the defendant was excused from performance and that his failure to perform did not constitute a breach of contract. Since this case, American courts have held that objective impossibility is an excuse for non-performance of a contract where there has been a destruction, material deterioration, or unavailability of the subject matter or means of performance of the contract through no fault of a party seeking the excuse. In some cases, a court will require the parties to have contemplated a particular source of supply or the condition when the parties entered into an agreement. It is interesting to note that the principle of impossibility is well illustrated by a number of cases involving the closing of the Suez Canal in 1956 and in 1967. (See 23 Rutgers L. Rev. 41 (1969). Because a substitute route around Africa was available, the court held that canal closings neither excused performance nor were grounds for the recovery of additional compensation under the theory of unforeseen difficulties.  Finally, the Restatement, Section 281, basically mirrors Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code and has introduced the concept of “commercial impracticability” into the discussion. It suggests that increases in costs “well beyond the normal range” that create “extreme and unreasonable difficulty” or “expense” could trigger the application of the doctrine of commercial impracticability, thus excusing performance or permitting a party to seek additional consideration.

 

Ethical Considerations

Time Is Of The Essence
 
Contracts frequently contain a “time is of the essence” clause. Are there any circumstances where a court should ignore such a clause and refuse to enforce it?
 
Debt Discharge
 
Sonny owes his Dad $10,000. One night, Sonny offers his Dad $5,000 to completely settle the debt and Dad accepts this offer. Later, Dad brings suit against Sonny for the remaining $5,000. Should Dad’s acceptance of the $5,000 discharge Sonny’s debt?
 

Questions

  1. Explain the doctrine of substantial performance.
  2. How do courts address performance subject to the satisfaction of one of the parties?
  3. Many contracts contain conditions. Explain conditions concurrent, precedent, or subsequent.
  4. What are the requirements for the creation of a novation?
  5. What is required to create an accord and satisfaction (refer to A.G. King Tree Surgeons v. Deeb)?
  6. In the case of anticipatory breach of contract, an aggrieved party may select from which two options?
  7. Explain how the doctrine of impossibility was applied in Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc.

 

Copyright © 2017 Hunter | Shannon | Amoroso | O’Sullivan-Gavin

Chapter Seven | Consideration

Consideration may be defined as “something bargained for in return for a promise.” Some promises have little or no legal significance because the element of bargain is missing. For example, if a person promises to give a gift to another person, a court would not generally impose an obligation to complete the gift because the bargain element is missing. Gifts are legally classified as donative transactions and are not enforceable as contractual promises — they are considered as gratuitous and not supported by consideration.

Consideration may consist of the following:

  • In a bilateral contract, the consideration for the promisor’s promise is a promise made by the promisee.
  • In a unilateral contract, the consideration for the promisor’s promise is the act of the promisee.
  • In a forbearance on the part of the promisee, which is defined as the giving up of a valid legal right. For example, “I will give up my right to sue you for defamation if you agree to retract your comments.”
  • In the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relationship. (Example: I promise to pay you $500 if you will agree to let me out of my apartment lease/revise my employment contract.)

The common law placed great emphasis on the concepts of “benefit” and “detriment” in deciding if a promise would be enforced. Under a modern view, courts look instead to the existence of the bargain to determine if a promise will be enforced.

Moral Obligations And Past Consideration
­

A promise based on past consideration (an act that occurred in the past), or upon a moral obli­ga­tion, a moral duty, a sense of honor, or love or affection is generally not enforceable­. For example, “in consideration of the fact that you named your first son Stanislaus in my honor, I promise to pay you $10,000.” This promise is generally not enforceable because the act had occurred in the past. How does this differ from the following promise; “If you agree to name your first son Stanislaus in my honor, I promise to pay you $10,000”?

The Rules of Consideration

There are two general rules that supply the basis for an understanding of consider­ation.

First, a court will not usually question the adequacy of consideration. That is, simply stated, courts are not generally concerned if the transaction was a good bargain or a bad bargain in an economic sense, only that there in fact was a bargain! This rule has one major exception: where a bargain is made between parties within a fiduciary or confidential relationship, a court of equity may be concerned with the adequacy of the bargain and will carefully scrutinize such a bargain in order to assure that any consideration was adequate.

The second general rule may be stated as follows: Once parties enter into an agreement, they are bound by the terms agreed upon. Any attempt to change the terms of the agreed-upon bargain (especially the compensation term), “hold out” or renegotiate a “better deal,” will be met with a “consideration problem” found in the application of what is known as the pre-existing duty rule.

Pre-Existing Duty Rule

The pre-existing duty rule states: “Where a party does or promises to do what he is already legally bound to do or promises to refrain from doing or refrains from doing what he is not legally permitted to do, he has not incurred legally sufficient detriment.” Under these circumstances, there is no consideration for the underlying promise. The pre-existing duty may arise in the context of a prior contract or may be imposed by a statute or law. Let’s look at three examples of the application of the pre-existing duty rule.

Example

Frederick agrees to hire Williams for a two-year period at $500 per week. After a six-month period, Frederick orally promises to increase Williams’ wages to $600 per week. Later, when Wil­liams notices that his pay has remained at $500, he contacts Frederick and Frederick refuses to increase the pay. Frederick’s promise to pay the additional $100 is unenforceable because it is essentially gratuitous and is not supported by consideration. Williams was already under a preexisting duty (a contract) to work for a two-year period for $500 per week.

Example

Ray Ryker is a Sheriff in Bergen County. When a drunk driver kills Mrs. Gyros’ husband, she posts a $5,000 reward for the capture of the driver. Later, when Ryker appre­hends the driver in a drunk-driving stop, he seeks the reward. Since Ryker was already under a preexisting duty to perform the act in question by virtue of his job as an under-sheriff, he is not entitled to the reward because he has suffered no legal detriment. Ryker has furnished no new or additional consider­ation to Mrs. Gyros for her promise.

The pre-existing duty rule has been seen as overly harsh and rigid in some circumstances where conditions change and where there may be legitimate reasons to seek a revision in contract terms. As a result, several exceptions to the pre-existing duty rule developed.

Example

Jacobs, a contractor, agrees to build a home for the Martins. After completing about half of the job, Jacobs demands an additional $10,000 or he will “walk out on the job.” Even if the Martins agree to the payment of the additional $10,000, their promise would not generally be enforceable because Jacobs was already under a preexisting duty to construct the home at the original contract price. Their promise to pay the additional amount of $10,000 is not supported by consideration and would be barred by the pre-existing duty rule. 

Rescission

It is entirely possible that two parties can mutually agree to terminate an existing agreement if the agreement is executory and has not yet been performed. The surrender of rights under the agreement by each party is the consideration for the mutual agreement of rescission. For example, Carr and Hanner enter into a con­tract whereby Carr will purchase Hanner’s Honda. Carr later calls Hanner and informs him that he is no longer interested and “could he just back out.” Hanner agrees. This results in a rescission of the original contract and a termination of the obligations of both parties.

Unforeseen Difficulties

During the performance of a contract, a party might encounter unforeseen and substantial problems that could not have been anticipated at the time the contract was entered into. These problems must be of the type and character that are “entirely beyond the contem­plation of the parties.” One such problem is seen in the concept of force majeure. Unforeseen difficulties would ordinarily not include occurrences such as strikes, labor shortages, inclement weather, or an increase in the price of components or goods. These types of “difficulties” indeed should have been foreseen and provided for in a contract, as risks which might be ordinarily or normally encountered in an “arms length” business relation­ship.

Secondly, if the “unforeseen difficulty” involves a severe and unexpected increase in price, as in Westinghouse Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation (405 F. Supp. 316 (1975), some courts will hold that the contract has been “frustrated” and will permit an increase in the price or will permit a party to remove him or herself from a contract. However, the increase in price or circumstances must be unusual, extreme, or severe.

Unforeseen difficulties may be analogized to the doctrine of “commercial impracticability” found in UCC Section 2-715 which provides a valid excuse for breach of contract “if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.”

It should be noted that while a plea to a court on grounds of “unforeseen difficulties” or “commercial impracticability” might be successful on the first occasion where a severe price increase occurs, most analysts agree that such a plea might not be appropriate or successful on a subsequent occasion.

Special Aspects of Consideration

Accord and Satisfaction

An issue may arise where a debtor realizes that he or she is in a relative position of strength with respect to the desire of a creditor to secure some amount of repayment on a debt. In such a case, the debtor may attempt to hold the payment hostage to a demand that the creditor will accept less than a contract requires. In contrast, there may be a case where the debtor has a genuine dispute with a creditor as to any amount owed that the debtor wishes to resolve the dispute by making a final payment. In this case, a debtor may attempt to discharge a disputed amount through an accord and satisfaction.

An accord and satis­faction is an attempt by a debtor to legally extinguish a debt by paying or tendering a lesser amount than that stipulated in the contract or that is demanded by a creditor. The accord is defined as the agreement whereby one of the parties undertakes to give or perform, and the other to accept, in satisfaction of a claim, something other than that which was originally promised or agreed upon. Satisfaction takes place when the accord is executed (when a party agrees to accept the lesser amount in satisfaction of the debt).

Read the following case carefully.

 

Case Summary

A. G. King Tree Surgeons v. Deeb

356 A.2d 87 (NJ 1976)

DALTON, J.

This is a contract action brought by A. G. King Tree Surgeons for the contract price of $480, plus tax and interest, for tree pruning work performed at the home of defendant George Deeb on or about May 30, 1975.

Plaintiff alleges the work was performed pursuant to an oral contract made by telephone, after an estimate of $480 had been transmitted orally, also by phone, to defendant. The work agreed on and actually performed was, according to plaintiff, the pruning of 15 trees on defendant’s property.

Defendant states by way of affirmative defense that * * * an accord and satisfaction was reached before the filing of this lawsuit. * * *

First, it is undisputed that defendant, upon receipt of the invoice for $504 (representing the $480 contract price plus $24 tax), protested to plaintiff by telephone that he had never entered into a contract for this amount and had only authorized an estimate from plaintiff, nor did he ever sign a contract or an acknowledgment of work performed. This is not, therefore, a case of a liquidat­ed sum which is due and owing but rather a genuine dispute between the parties as to what liability, if any, defendant owes to plaintiff for the work performed.

Second, it is undisputed that shortly after this controversy arose defendant’s attorney forwarded to plaintiff defendant’s check in the amount of $100 with a notation typed on the reverse side (above the space for the endorser’s signature) to the effect that this $100 was in full and final settlement of all claims of A. G. King against defendant for work performed in May 1975. Along with the check defendant’s attorney sent a letter of transmittal which stated in no uncertain terms that although defendant denied that authorization was ever given to plaintiff to perform work for defendant, nevertheless the $100 check was submitted in good faith in an attempt to amicably settle the claim, and that if plaintiff wished to settle for this amount, he should deposit the check. Plaintiff corporation, through its president A. G. King, did deposit the check but only after he obliterated the notation placed on it by the drawer and substituted in its place a notation that the check was only in partial payment of the amount due. Based on this set of facts defendant argues that an accord and satisfaction was reached between the parties at the time the check was deposited, notwithstanding the fact that the president of plaintiff corporation altered the notation on the reverse side of the check. This court agrees.

The traditional elements of an accord and satisfac­tion are the following: (1) a dispute as to the amount of money owed; (2) a clear manifestation of intent to settle the dispute; (3) accep­tance of satisfaction by the creditor.

The president of plaintiff corporation alleges, of course, that there could be no acceptance of any offer of settlement since he deliberately altered the check before depositing it, making it clear that he considered the $100 only a partial payment and not a full settlement of the matter. However, it is clear that plaintiff had no right to alter the check. If the check was unacceptable as a final settlement, plaintiff’s remedy was to return the check to defendant and sue for the full amount claimed due. Plaintiff chose rather to alter the check, accept the $100 “in partial payment” and sue for the difference.

In this case, however, the check did not stand alone; it was accompanied by a letter from defendant’s attorney which made it clear that (1) there was a genuine dispute between the parties as to what amount of money, if any, was due plaintiff; (2) defendant intended that the $100 check was to be in full satisfaction of the dispute between the parties; and (3) if, and only if, plaintiff agreed to settle the dispute for this amount, the check was to be deposited.

It is the opinion of this court that the check and letter can, and indeed must, be read together as consti­tuting an offer to settle this dispute for $100, and that the depositing of the check constituted the acceptance of this offer. Once the check was deposited by plaintiff, no matter what alterations the corporation’s president personally made on its reverse side, an accord and satisfaction was reached. * * *

The letter of transmittal * * * recites the basis of the genuine dispute between the parties and the intent of defendant to have the enclosed payment totally satisfy the dispute, and this satisfies the first two require­ments of an accord and satisfaction. The third require­ment of an accord and satisfaction is the acceptance of the offer and, in this case, the deposit of the check by plaintiff operated ipso facto as such an acceptance. * * *

Judgment for defendant.

Substitutes for Valuable Consideration

Some promis­es may be enforced without consider­ation, either on grounds of public policy or in the exercise of a court’s equitable jurisdiction. These include:
A composition of creditors’ agreement is an agree­ment between an insolvent debtor and his/her creditors under which the creditors will accept either a specified amount or a percent­age of the amount owed. Such an agreement is fully enforce­able without consideration. These agreements frequently are substitutes for a filing of a petition in bankruptcy and are favored by courts.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel: This equitable doctrine is usually applied where a promisor makes a gratuitous promise, often involving a promise to make a gift. The parties are not bargaining for anything in a true commercial sense. For example, Aunt Edna tells her godson, Richard: “I promise to pay you $500 per week so you won’t have to teach any longer.” Later, Richard quits his job, but Aunt Edna now refuses to pay. The doctrine of promissory estoppel may permit the court to enforce Aunt Edna’s promise under certain circumstances if Richard has relied on the promise and changed his position by resigning from his teaching job.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel is based on the re­quirement of reliance on the part of the promisee. It is found in Section 90 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts:
“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”

One final point. In enforcing a promise based on promissory estoppel, a court may only enforce the promise to the extent of the reasonable reliance damages of the promise — not necessarily the full amount of the contract.

For example, suppose Jerry Lynch promises to donate $500,000 to St. Rose Church for the Athletic Fund and its drive to build an athletics complex. Based on Lynch’s pledge, St. Rose hires an engineer and clears two fields of underbrush. Later, Lynch backs out of his promise. If Lynch were sued on his promise under a contract theory, a court would probably dismiss the suit because, as we know, a promise to make a gift is generally not enforce­able because it is not supported by consideration. However, if a court were to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel, St. Rose might be able to enforce the promise to the extent of its reasonable reliance damages—the monies actually expended by St. Rose in reliance on Lynch’s promise. Remember, promissory estoppel is not consideration; it is a substitute for consideration.

 

Ethical Considerations

Berry and Cleary

Berry Publishing is in a dispute with the Cleary Corporation, a book printing company located in South Bend, Indiana. Berry claims that Cleary has breached its contract with Berry by failing to deliver on its promise to produce sufficient copies of the “History of The Chicago Cubs” for distribution in several “Chicagoland” banks as a premium for opening up a new checking or savings account. After months of frustration and protracted negotations regarding acquiring a credit, Berry sends a check to Cleary, deducting $100,000, an amount it calculates represents its losses on the project. Cleary receives a letter explaining this deduction and a check reflecting the deduction. However, Cleary has crossed out the notation “Paid In Full” on the memo portion of the check and wrote “Partial Payment” instead.

Should a court enforce the alleged “accord and satisfaction” even though Cleary maintains that it was Berry who actually was responsible for the loss because they had delayed in providing the page proofs to Cleary? Shouldn’t this case proceed to a trial on the issues rather than on a “technical rule” like an “accord and satisfaction?”

 

Questions

  1. Find the unusual case of Fiege v. Boehm. Read it carefully. Do you agree with the court’s conclusion?

A. G. King Tree Surgeons v. Deeb

  1. What did King do when he received Deeb’s check?
  2. What are the elements of an “accord and satisfaction”? Were they present here?

 

Copyright © 2017 Hunter | Shannon | Amoroso | O’Sullivan-Gavin